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I. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to gain knowledge of the determinants of Argentina's country risk, measured by the spread of sovereign bonds in relation to comparable bonds of the U.S. Treasury. The importance of the subject lies on the crucial role that this risk plays in determining financial costs and real business cycles.
A review of the empirical literature shows that this subject has not been studied enough. Only few economists have emphasized -taking into account the domestic and international context of the 90s and the lessons from the 80s-the relevance of country risk on the dynamics of the Argentine economy.
1 These authors base their analysis on three approaches (which do not exclude each other). A first group, has found a significant (negative) correlation between the large macroeconomic aggregates and the risk premium (Avila, 1997; Grandes, 1999; and Rodríguez, 1999) . A second group has emphasized the currency risk, arguing that once this disappears with dollarization, there will be a lower Argentine risk and, therefore, a higher growth and employment rate (Rubinstein, 1999) . The third approach analyzes the relationship between capital flows, contagion effects and the incidence on sovereign risk of emerging countries (Calvo and Reinhart, 1996; Calvo, 1999) . Also, an increasing number of studies have analyzed the determinants of the sovereign risk, using cross-section of countries. However, these papers have not focused on the determinants of Argentina's country risk.
We organize our contribution as follows. In Section II, we discuss the scope of the subject and the theoretical framework, while in Section III we present the analysis of the determinants of sovereign or country risk. In Section IV, we present estimates of the econometric model. Using this model, Section V offers an alternative analysis of the possible effects that a dollarization policy could have. Finally, in Section VI, we draw the main conclusions and policy recommendations. Figure 1 shows for the 1994-1998 period, the relation between country risk (SPFRB, approximated by the spread between the floating rate bond and a similar bond of the U.S. Treasury), and the interannual variations of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 2 2 The pioneer paper analyzing the relation between these variables is by Avila (1998) . More recently, Nogués (1999) presented Figure 1 in an article in La Nación, and Rodríguez (1999) developed a model of the economy also based on the central role of country risk. This negative correlation is not surprising when we recall that the most important components of GDP -private consumption and investment in equipment-are negatively correlated with country risk. For instance, the simple correlation between the interannual variations of these variables and
II. Relevance of the Subject and Theoretical Framework
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VAR. INTERANUAL PBI the country risk lagged one period, are -0,61 and -0,80 respectively. 3 On the other hand, the correlation between the interannual variation of GDP and country risk -also lagged one period-is -0,86.
Are these spurious correlations or are there solid grounds to argue that there should be an association between country risk and the behavior of macroeconomic variables? The relationships between financial variables and country risk helps to explain why changes in this last variable has an impact on the main components of aggregate demand. In an economy like Argentina, open to international capital flows, the evolution of interest rates is closely determined by country risk (and if we considered a group of bonds with different maturities, the corresponding spreads would determine the structure of interest rates). Figure 2 shows, for instance, that during the period under analysis, the behavior of the 30 day domestic prime rate in dollars (PRIMEU$S) is associated with country risk. 3 The coefficients of correlation presented in this section use quarterly observations for the 1994-I to 1998-IV period. For a multivariate analysis of the determinants of investment in equipment, including the independent role of country risk, see Grandes (1999) . In a nutshell, being a small country, Argentina faces a very elastic supply of financing (except in times of rationing), and therefore the upward and downward shifts of this schedule determine the equilibrium interest rate. In other words, the analysis of the determinants of country risk is also an analysis of the variables determining the shifts of the supply of loanable funds faced by the country. Therefore, increases in country risk should be negatively associated with capital flows. Figure 3 shows that this has in fact happened in connection with flows from the non-financial private sector (PNSPRNF). 4, 5 4 In this case, the simple correlation coefficient between these capital flows and country risk is -0.58. 5 The Federal Government has the possibility of financing itself through multilateral credit institutions. These capital flows tend to be positively associated with country risk. When country risk increases and the private sector has difficulties financing itself in the international markets, the Federal Government lessens the recessive effects by borrowing from multilateral credit institutions. Obviously, given the loanable restrictions of these institutions, this kind of financing has a limit, which Argentina has approached in recent years 
Figure 3. Country Risk and Capital Flows
Basis points U$S millions Therefore, to make headway towards the knowledge of country risk determinants, also means to make progress on the determinants of capital flows and consequently, on Argentina's business cycles.
III. The Determinants of Country Risk
A. The Risk Premium in Equilibrium
For an economy with high capital mobility and imperfect substitute assets, assuming that lenders are risk neutral, the rate of return rate on a sovereign bond depends on the following arbitrage condition (see Edwards, 1986, and Min, 1998) :
where i * is the risk free rate of return on the U.S. Treasury, s is the country risk premium and p is the probability of default (linked to the capacity and willingness for debt repayment). Therefore:
where k = 1 + i * . As the probability of default tends to one, the risk premium approaches infinity. Graphically, we observe that the relation between s and p implies a variation of the supply of funds -for a given i * -, because when the size of the debt increases (in relation to GDP), the probability of default also increases ( Figure 4 ). As this approaches one, the borrower will see his possibilities of placing bonds restrained ("rationing").
where X i are the determinants of the sovereign risk premia and β i the respective impact coefficients. Finally, combining (2) and (3), applying natural logs, the equation turns out to be:
B. Which Would be the X i to Consider?
A first idea about the determinants of country risk emerges from the analysis of sovereign rating agencies. These agencies monitor the evolution of governments' debt and their economies, issuing recommendations about the quality of the debt. Usually, those recommendations -appropriate or not- have a notorious impact on investors'portfolio decisions and in general, they bring about changes in relative asset demands and bond prices (see, for instance, Reisen and Von Maltzan, 1999; Cantor and Packer, 1996) . Rating agencies like Standard & Poor's (see Standard & Poor's 1999b ) focus their analysis on three determinants of country risk, which are common sense: (1) Indicators of liquidity/solvency: these are macroeconomic variables, related to the possibilities of debt repayment; (2) Political uncertainty; and (3) Structural reforms.
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Our paper will also analyze other factors determining risk levels, including the contagion effect. These are described in Section IV.
As noted before, these theories have been devised using alternative methods to evaluate sovereign risk determinants. First, a cross section of countries has been used to explain: a) the ratings of agencies (Haque, Mark and Mathieson, 1998; Cantor and Packer, 1996; and Kiguel and Lopetegui, 1997) , b) the bond spreads (Calvo and Reinhardt, 1996; and Calvo, 1999) , and, c) the relationship between both (Kiguel and Lopetegui, 1997; and Reisen and Von Maltzan, 1999) . Second, there have been few country specific studies (Barbone and Forni, 1997, and Rubinstein, 1999) . Finally, others have used a combination of both methods (Min, 1998; and Eichengreen and Mody, 1998) .
IV. Econometric Estimation
A. Selected Variables
The proposed model explains country risk as a function of the behavior of a set of variables (X i ), classified according to the theoretical framework outlined above. That is, the sovereign risk premium, measured by the spread of the floating rate bond (SPFRB) 9 is a function of:
Macroeconomic fundamentals
Essentially, we propose that reductions in budget surplus (DFISCSA), or increases in fiscal deficit (when DFISCSA takes on negative values), will raise the country risk, even more so under convertibility, where fiscal policy is the main macroeconomic instrument. 10 A fiscal deficit that investors deem high, increasing or unsustainable (even though this perception is not accurate) would frame the most pessimistic scenario. It is also possible to present arguments in favor of analyzing the role of public expenditures, the tax structure, or the fiscal responsibility of the Federal Government and the provinces separately. However, our hypothesis is that these are, from the point of view of investors, of second order importance. In their generation of short and medium term expectations, they do not care so much on how the deficit is going to be reduced, but if this is going to happen in a sustainable way. We will return to this issue in the last section.
We also argue that growth expectations affect country risk 11 . If investors 9 We used the FRB because of its high liquidity and its role as a determinant of the tendency of the bonds of Argentine debt. In any case, this selection is not free of criticism, (see Abelar, 1999) . Alternatively, we could have used the EMBI (emerging market bond indicator), from JP Morgan. However, this index includes a variety of bonds (Global, Brady, Bocones, and other bonds) with different degrees of maturity and guarantees.
Although there are problems with any selection, it is important to know that for Argentina, there is a high correlation between the FRB and the EMBI. 10 The fiscal deficit is from the Federal Administration without taking into account privatizations, and without consolidating the provinces. It comprises the seasonally adjusted deficit accumulated over a period of three months. 11 We do not infer from here causality between country risk and the growth rate. Moreover, these variables might be clearly endogenous, and this fact could bring about some consequences to the econometric estimation. Some authors (Avila, 1998 and Rodríguez, expect the economy to grow, then the country risk should decline among other things, because of the effects that this growth generates over the size of the fiscal deficit.
To capture growth expectations, we assume that investors have perfect foresight. We apply this assumption by recalling that GDP data is known with one-quarter lag. Therefore, growth expectations in period T-1 for period T, would be the growth rate in T, which in fact is published with a lag. Consequently, we have included the GDP growth rate estimated as a seasonally adjusted monthly value, as an explanatory variable. The growth rate is the difference between the logs of GDP in T and T-1 (DLGDP93SA). We have considered that alternative monthly data such as the industrial survey are too partial and therefore, they would capture growth expectations in an imperfect way.
Intertemporal liquidity/solvency variables
Among the possible variables that capture the intertemporal liquidity situation of a country, analysts assess external debt services (capital and interest) to exports ratio (SERVEXPOSA) 12 . Increases in this ratio are expected to increase country risk. During the period under analysis, both variables have grown but the ratio has been increasing. The reason is due to 1999) suggest that country risk determines the short term growth rate (for instance, through the effect on physical investments). However, a Granger casuality test between country risk premium and the growth rate did not provide definite results to conclude causality in one direction or the other. We think that there are reasons to argue that this causality is two way. See appendix (e) for the results of the test. 12 Interests and capital services come from the balance of payments estimates. For 1994, there is no data on debt amortizations of the non-financial private sector. Also, due to lack of information, capital services of the financial sector -excluding the Central Bank-are not included. The capital services of the public sector exclude the conversions of debt due to privatizations or former debt repurchasing. Exports were seasonally adjusted. Otherwise, the fluctuations of that indicator would be magnified by seasonal factors. On the other hand, debt service is estimated on an accrual basis.
an important rise in public external debt, mainly to finance fiscal deficits, and the increase of private external debt 13 , associated to a group of firms, most of them linked to foreign direct investment (Secretary of Economic and Regional Programming, 1999a) .
Another solvency variable is the current account surplus to GDP ratio (CCGDP). Some analysts even mention certain negative values of this ratio (usually around -5%) below which it becomes too risky to lend to the country. We believe that there may be non-linearities but not discontinuities in these economic relationships. As shown in Figure 5 , in Argentina as in many other countries, the current account deficit is shaped by the trade deficit. Therefore, the current account includes significant information that is not captured by the ratio of debt service to exports.
The trade balance depends on prices and quantities. Being a small country, Argentina is a price taker and consequently, we could say that the terms of trade (TI) are a determinant of country risk.
Contagion effects
We have captured these effects through the J. P. Morgan's price index of Mexican bonds (EMBIMEX) and other non-Latin American countries (EMBINONLAT). We chose Mexico because of the historical similarities with Argentina in terms of economic policy and response to external shocks (Brazil, despite its influence on the Mercosur, has differed, for instance, in foreign capital regulations, the trade openness degree, dollarization extent, etc).
14 Obviously, we expect increases in these sovereign risks to have a positive effect on Argentina's country risk. According to this theory, the path of emerging bond prices would be influenced by "herd behavior", resulting from the simplistic similarities that large international operators of financial funds find between "emerging" countries. The most recent example of this kind of behavior was observed during the Russian "default" and later in the southern cone, while Brazilian devaluation was taking place.
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15 Although the econometric treatment of the possible existence of credit rationing is beyond the scope of this paper, the contagion variable is also capturing the reduction in the supply of loanable funds, particularly in times of financial market turmoil.
Current Account Deficit Merchandise deficit Rents Deficit
Other external shocks
Other external shocks can arise from changes in the conditions of international financial markets. We have tried to capture these conditions by including the rate of the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond (UST30) as an explanatory variable. We expect, through a substitution effect, that increases in the interest rate make the investment in these bonds more attractive, so that the supply of loanable funds for emerging countries would diminish and, therefore, the country risk would increase. On the other hand, we observe that, in periods of extreme crises, investors take refuge in risk free bonds, in detriment of the emerging markets, pushing U.S. bond rates down and increasing country risk of emerging markets. Then, the expected sign of this variable is ambiguous.
We have also introduced a dummy variable to reflect the impact of the Mexican crisis. This variable (TEQUILA) would be capturing the effects on country risk caused by the abnormal and significant reduction of domestic deposits ( Figure 6 ). After the Tequila, the banking system became stronger due to the adoption of more stringent regulations than the Basle ones, and the larger concentration and presence of foreign capital in the local banking sector. Because of this, the strength of the financial system is no longer an important concern of the rating agencies (see Standard & Poor's, 1999a) . In fact, the correlation between deposits and SPFRB drops significantly after the Tequila.
Political noise
Although there are numerous situations when the untimely statements or the turmoil among political leaders could have provoked a negative perception among investors, we chose to test the political noise associated to the resignation of former Minister Cavallo (CAVALLO).
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Sovereign risk's own story
We have included lags of the spreads of FRB bonds (SPFRB t-j ) in order to test for persistent factors that may not be captured by other variables.
Summing up, the following is the econometric model we propose with the expected signs in parentheses:
The equation was estimated by ordinary least squares, setting a log-linear relationship among the variables, with the exception of CCGDP and DFISCSA, whose values are mostly negative and thereby cannot be transformed to logs. The monthly data comprise the period running from January 1994 to December 1998. In appendix (a) we explain the data sources and the method of transforming quarterly to monthly values used for some variables including GDP.
17 Considering the fact this is a time series model, we also controlled for stationarity and checked the existence of a long run structural relation through a relatively new methodology developed by Pesaran et al (1999) .
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The Tequila effect and the exit of former Minister Cavallo are captured by binary variables where Tequila = 1 between 1995:1 and 1995:5 and zero otherwise, and Cavallo = 1 in 1996:3 and 4, due to the rumors associated to the differences between the former Minister and the President, and 1996: 7 and 8, moment of Cavallo's resignation and its immediate effects.
The estimated coefficients can be read as elasticities, except for CCGDP and DFISCSA which are semielasticities (percent change of the dependent variable due to an absolute change in the independent variable). Time lags of the independent variables were also included with the purpose of capturing partial adjustment effects.
19 Remaining lags were chosen through tests of omitted/redundant variables, beginning with a more restricted model, and going from particular to general, to minimize the loss of freedom degrees. Table 1 shows the best outcome of the econometric estimations. The estimated coefficients are significant both individually and globally at a 1% confidence level, and the regression does not have problems of serial correlation, heteroskedasticity or instability (see statistical Appendix d). In the estimation of the whole model, LTI, CCGDP, LEMBINONLAT and the lagged dependent variable were not significant. As said, the terms of trade effects are implicit in the current account deficit. However, the variable CCGDP was not significant either, and our hypothesis is that investors pay more attention to indicators of intertemporal solvency like SERVEXPOSA, than to variables that have important cyclical variations. On the other hand, EMBINONLAT is strongly correlated to EMBIMEX and the estimations corroborate that this country had, during the period under analysis, more cross contagion effects with Argentina.
B. Result of the Estimations
Dismissing the statistically non-significant variables, the estimates had the outcome presented above. Except for the Tequila effect, the signs of the estimators are the expected ones and that of LUST30 is explained later. Our hypothesis on the negative sign of the Tequila variable is that, when "clouds" were visualized over the Argentine economy, political determination to overcome the crisis, as well as clear signals from international financial institutions in support of the economic program, were combined to diminish the negative consequences caused by contagion effects. We recall that the President, his Minister of Economy and the Congress acted decisively. Likewise, the IMF, the World Bank and the IDB prepared their assistance program in record time. We think that this determination was crucial to lessen and to overcome an extremely serious financial-banking crisis.
Other results suggest first, that a 1% increase in the price of Mexican bonds ("less emerging risk") produces a drop of Argentine risk of 2.16%.
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Second, a variation of the same magnitude in the debt service to export ratio of the previous month and in its rate of growth (DLSERVEXPOSA) generates a 0.17% and 0.5% increase in that risk respectively. 22 That is, a permanent 21 It is fair to acknowledge that LEMBIMEX accounts for almost half the R-squared, as the Mexican risk co-moves rather similarly with the Argentinean one. However, from early 1998 on -and especially in the aftermath of the Russian default-the first has been clearly differing from Argentinean spreads due to a lot of good news for the Mexican economy (e.g. growth, investment grade in March 2000). So the idea of including LEMBIMEX was exactly to be aware of the impact of emerging risk on Argentinean total risk. 22 Taking into account that debt service data for 1994 is not strictly comparable with those in 1995-1998 (see note 12), we estimated the same equation in this last period to confirm the strength of the results (see Appendix f).
1% increase in this variable and in its growth rate, causes a permanent 0.67% increase in the spread of the FRB. This result, as we will emphasize in the last section, has important policy implications. The effects of macroeconomic fundamentals on LSPFRB are also important. An increase in growth expectations of 1 point (i.e. growth of 2% instead of 1%) would reduce country risk by almost 20%. The reduction of the fiscal deficit (i.e. DFISCSA less negative or more positive in case of surplus) has also a positive impact on the evolution of LSPFRB: for each 300 millions pesos decrease in the three months accumulated deficit, the sovereign risk would go down by approximately 5.4%. 23 The variation of this deficit also has an influence on LSPFRB (investors analyze not only the level of the deficit, but also its change). As said, part of the short-term impact of fiscal deficits may be captured by the growth expectation variable.
The negative sign of the 30 year U.S. Treasury bond rate needs some comment. A priori, we expected that an increase in this rate attracted additional investment to this instrument in detriment of capital flows to emerging countries. Nevertheless, as we see in Figure 7 , the correlation between the spread of the FRB and the rate of the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond is very low. However, there are clear inverse relations in periods of turmoil or extreme financial crises (Mexico, Asia, Russia). In these cases, what we have seen is that as the perceived risk of investing in emerging markets increases, investors "fly to quality" by buying Treasury bonds. Other contributions like Min's (1998) have also found that U.S. Treasury bonds rates don't have significant substitution effects with emerging bonds.
In a panel data study, Eichengreen and Mody (1998) find a similar result. These authors assert that movements in U.S. Treasury bonds rate should be understood in terms of supply and demand. On the supply side, when the rate goes up, the increased debt servicing costs reduces the supply of external debt. This in turn would increase the price of emerging bonds reducing their spreads. On the demand side, when Treasury bonds rate goes up, there would be investors' tendency to substitute emerging bonds with U.S. Treasury bonds, and the spreads would increase. According to those authors, in recent years supply factors have prevailed.
C. Forecasts
An alternative way of evaluating the model is to analyze the in-sample forecasts emerging from it, using indicators such as the mean square error as criterions. The forecast shown is recursive, that is, the model is recalculated for the period T and T + 1 with known data of the independent variables for that period. If, for example, the year 1998 is projected, the values observed in Table 2 show the results. 
V. An Observation on the Project of Dollarization
The sovereign risk can be broadly considered the sum of 1) the default risk, 2) the risk of devaluation or currency risk, 3) the political risk and, 4) other domestic and foreign institutional risks.
A non-anticipated devaluation can compromise debt repayment. The larger the proportion of debt denominated in foreign currency and the less dollarized are fiscal revenues (current and capital), the higher the default risk. In other words, the government would have to make a bigger fiscal effort in order to serve the debt. Under those conditions, investors would demand an additional risk premium to maintain assets of the country that face a possibility of devaluation.
Recently, due to the Brazilian crisis and the important external volatility, in Argentina the project of dollarization has been gaining ground. One of the eventual advantages of dollarization would be the disappearance of currency risk with a corresponding -according to the advocates of this policy-reduction of country risk. This statement has been discussed in the academic-professional literature, and some recent papers have explored the impact of implementing a policy of dollarization on the interest rate (see, for instance, Rubinstein, 1999) . 24 Regarding these papers, we have some remarks: • The way to measure the currency risk is partially incorrect: In general, those studies use the difference between the returns of the Bocon in pesos (PRE1) and the Bocon in dollars (PRE2). 25 However, that difference is not exactly the risk of maintaining an asset in one currency or another, because the spread of these bonds also includes other risks such as the default risk, the political risk, and others. Precisely, in the event of a devaluation, the repayment of PRE2 could be compromised more than the repayment of PRE1.
• At the same time, there would be a simultaneity bias in determining the sovereign risk and the currency risk, because this is a component of the first one. As a solution to this shortcoming, an instrumental variable (for instance, the lags) is usually used. The forward exchange rate, though it represents a thinner market, is a more genuine way of measuring the expectation of devaluation.
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• The order of temporal precedence is not clear (Figure 8 ). Even assuming simultaneity, causality in a Granger sense can be tested. Taking the spreads of the FRB (SPFRB) and the bocones, we conclude that the order of causality is reverse to the one assumed: with a 1% significance, SPFRB Granger-cause PRE1_PRE2, in the period 1994:1 to 1998:12 (Table 3) . Furthermore, in the model of the previous section, the joint effect of the variable PRE1_PRE2 and its lags (up to t-3) was redundant. 27 That is, in a 26 Another problem with the series of the forward exchange rate is the sample size. The one compiled by JP Morgan begins in 1997. 27 Strictly speaking, since the FRB is issued in dollars, the currency risk is null. However, we want to verify that this did not have another indirect effects on SPRFB, which were not captured by the rest of the explanatory variables. 
Figure 8
Basis points joint test, the currency risk measured by this difference, turned out not to be a statistically significant variable to explain LSPFRB (Table 4 ). This means that its elimination would not have a statistically significant impact on country risk.
Table 4
Redundant Variables: LPRE1_PRE2 (0 to -3) F-statistic 0.457169 Probability 0.766512 Log likelihood ratio 2.514626 Probability 0.642019
The explanation we offer is that the currency risk is explained by almost the same variables that explain country risk. The econometric evidence supporting this hypothesis is shown in appendix g. This does not necessarily mean that a dollarization project would not decrease sovereign risk. Our results indicate that if the fundamental variables explaining country risk do not improve, then dollarization will not revert the situation. Obviously, the effects of a policy of dollarization also depend on the institutional characteristics that go together with its implementation. This is an important subject which is beyond the scope of this paper.
VI. Summary and Policy Recommendations
Several economists, including the authors, have emphasized the relevance of the fact that country risk is correlated with the business cycles. That happens because Argentina is a country open to international capital flows and therefore, the structural conditions of the financial markets faced by agents are associated to these flows.
Under this situation the key question is: Which factors determine country risk? The purpose of this paper has been to provide an answer to this question and as far as we know, it offers the first econometric analysis for Argentina. Using monthly data for the period 1994-1998, we conclude that the important fluctuations observed in country risk have been determined by: (i) the external debt service (capital and interests) to export ratio as a variable reflecting the burden of the debt, (ii) the fiscal deficit of the Federal Government as a variable reflecting the disequilibrium of public accounts, (iii) growth expectations as a variable reflecting the potentiality of the economy, (iv) the rate of the 30 year U.S. Treasury bond as a variable reflecting the conditions and substitution possibilities of international financial markets, (v) the contagion effect and, (vi) political noise.
Regarding the impact of a possible dollarization policy, we recall that the devaluation risk is a component of country risk. However, we find that eliminating the devaluation risk (measured through the differential of the returns on bocones in pesos and in dollars) would not have a statistically significant impact on country risk. The explanation we offer is that devaluation risk is determined by practically the same variables that explain country risk. This evidence suggests that what is important in order to diminish this risk is not the implementation of a unilateral dollarization policy, but a sound administration of economic fundamentals.
Going now to the implications of our basic findings, we stress in the first place, that during the period under analysis, the variables capturing the situation of external payments of the country have deteriorated significantly. For instance, between 1995 and 1998, the debt service practically doubled, while the value of exports increased by only 26%. This deterioration of solvency indicators plus the more restrictive conditions in the international financial markets, imply that the country risk has suffered a structural increase and, unless extraordinary conditions develop, it will be very difficult to lower this risk to the levels observed during say 1997 when the average spread of the FRB was around 360 basis points.
Given the impossibility of significantly reducing the debt service in the short and medium term, we conclude that one of the main factors leading to lower country risk is the export growth. Although Argentina is a price taker, this does not mean that important productivity enhancing and market opening policies should be disregarded. For example, at the Uruguay Round, Argentina received no concessions of economic significance. During the next years, these negotiating weaknesses will have to change in order to improve Argentina's export and growth performance.
Our paper also shows that fiscal deficit has direct negative effects in the short and medium run (through an increase in the debt stock as well as its service). In the short run, the deficit should be reduced significantly in order to stabilize and revert the growing external debt. Eventually, the deficit should turn into a surplus, part of which could be used to diminish the debt stock. In that sense, the approval of the law of fiscal solvency is a major step forward which if implemented, will put an asymptotic limit to the stock of external public debt of the National Government. The sooner equilibrium and fiscal surpluses are achieved in a credible and sustainable way, the faster will be the reduction in country risk. Here the key words are credible and sustainable and that depends not only on economic factors, but also on social and political situations. In this context, the worst scenario is one where the fiscal responsibility law is not enforced, or the uncertainty generated by the legislative process is such that the political noise ends up raising the country risk. Recently, we have observed several episodes when this has happened. Therefore, besides good policies, it is important for the political leaders to be aware of the magnitude of what is at stake for the country. Only then and after a consistent effort over several years, the country will achieve the desired "investment grade" rating.
optimum lags for ∆Y t-1 , are shown next:
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C. Pesaran, Shin and Smith Test
The traditional approach to verify the existence of a long-term relationship among a set of variables is based on cointegration techniques (Engle and Granger, 1987; Phillips and Ouilaris, 1990; Johansen, 1991 and 1995; among others) . These techniques require variables to be integrated of order one, I(1). Pesaran et al (1999) have proposed a new approach to test the existence of a long-term relation that can be applied independently from the order of integration of the regressors. This means that it is not transcendental if they are I(0), I(1) or mutually cointegrated. The underlying statistic is the Wald or F-statistic in a Dickey-Fuller regression (ARDL model).
The authors supply two sets of asymptotic critical values for the polar cases: the first assumes that all the variables are I(1), while the second assumes that all are I(0). So all the possibilities are delimited for any classification from a combination of these limit values. If the Wald or the F statistic computed falls outside the area delimited by those values, then a conclusive inference on the long term relationship could be induced independently of whether the regressors are I(0), I(1) or mutually cointegrated. Nevertheless, if the Wald and the F statistics fall within the delimited area, the inference would be inconclusive and it would be necessary to know the order of integration of the regressors.
Likewise, the test can be performed whether the dependent variable follows a deterministic tendency, or not. In the case of the spread of a bond, we opted for the second choice. Therefore, we estimated the following equation selecting the quantity of lags according to the above-mentioned Akaike-criteria (the minimum):
where Z t = (LSPFRB, LTI, LEMBIMEX, LEMBINONLAT, LSERVEXPOSA, LUST30, CCGDP, DFISCSA, DLGDP93SA) = (LSPFRB, W t ); β is a parameter vector. The null hypothesis is Ho: λ = β = 0 The number of optimum lags was 6 (according the Akaike's minimum criteria) and as a question of parsimony -so that we do not use excessive parameters in the model-non-significant variables were excluded in the equation (1), that is: LTI, CCPBI and LEMBINONLAT). The result of the test shed the following value for F: F 6.474187 Probability 0.001297
As the asymptotic F distribution under the null hypothesis is not standard, we used the critical values estimated by Pesaran et al in Table C1 .iii, page [T.2]. For k = 5 regressors and 5% significance, those values are 2.62 -lowest limit when the regressors are I(0)-and 3.79 -highest limit when the regressors are I(1). Given the estimated F, we conclude that there could be a long run relation among the variables irrespective they are cointegrated, or they are from different order of integration.
C'. Associated Error Correction Model
Once the long-run relationship was regressed (Table 1) we went forward to estimate the corresponding ECM (error correction model) in order to see the short-term dynamics of sovereign spreads corresponding to the structural model. The ECM representation can be defined as follows:
There, Resid t-1 are the residuals from equation in Table 1 , ∆ means the first difference of any variable, X refers to the remaining independent variables and ε t is an independently identically distributed error. For a matter of stability it is expected ρ to be negative and smaller than one, as it works like the mechanism which takes Lspfrb back to its long-run equilibrium level when a short-term deviation occurs. After carefully carrying out this two-step estimation and with a parsimonious purpose -but ensuring no autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity were in-we concluded in the restricted model below with a significant ρ equal to -0.71. This means that 71% of the gap is closed in one month. 4. Cusum Test: we find stable parameters given the sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) falls within the confidence interval.
E. Granger Causality Tests
In our study case, we performed the test between SPFRB and real GDP growth. For the last, we took both the seasonal adjusted rate (DLGDP93SA) and interannual rate (DLGDP93SAINT). Moreover, we included lags to evaluate whether the prediction improved (ensuring that conclusions were robust). We conclude that there is Granger-bicausality when we take the interannual GDP growth rate (DLPBI93SAINT) and causality from GDP growth to SPFRB when considering the seasonal adjusted rate (DLGDP93SA). Therefore, we cannot conclude that there is causality in one or other direction. This does not necessarily mean there wouldn't be economic bicausality, as explained above.
F. Model's Estimates for 1995-1998
While running this regression we tested parameter stability by reestimating the model for the period 1995:1 to 1998:12. We did so to be sure that using 100% comparable data regarding debt service series, the original estimation was robust. As observed above, the results are globally quite good though some variables turn out to be not significant at the individual level. We confirm the negative effects from those variables connected with contagion effects, fiscal deficit and debt service to exports ratio, as well as the UST 30 years bond rate, over PRE1-PRE2. Therefore, we could preliminary ascertain that currency risk would be associated to a group of the same variables which account for SPFRB variations.
